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14	Insurers Association of America, Independe Agents and Brokers of California, and National Califo	onal
15	Association of Insurance and Financial Adv California	isors —
16	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
17	FOR THE COU	NTY OF ORANGE
18	CIVIL COMPLEX CENTER	
19	PACIFICARE LIFE AND HEALTH	Case No. 30-2014-00733375-CU-WM-
20	INSURANCE COMPANY,	CXC Judge Kim G. Dunning
21	Petitioner and Plaintiff, v.	File No. UPA 2007-00004
22	DAVE JONES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF	OAH No. 2009061395
23	THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
24	Respondent and Defendant.	MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE
25		Date: January 7, 2015
26		Time: 1:30 p.m. Dept.: CX104
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INTRODUCTION

On June 9, 2014, Dave Jones, in his capacity as Insurance Commissioner of California ("the Commissioner"), issued a decision in *In the Matter of the Order to Show Cause and Accusation Against: PacifiCare Life and Health Insurance Company* ("the Opinion"). The Opinion created a new, unfounded, and overreaching interpretation of the California Unfair Insurance Practices Act ("UIPA"), a statutory scheme applicable to every licensee of the California Department of Insurance ("CDI") doing business in this state. Moreover, the Commissioner designated the Opinion as a "precedent" decision, indicating that it will have a binding effect on all CDI licensees. ¹

Contrary to California law, the Opinion rules that:

- An alleged violation of a statute outside the UIPA may be treated as a violation of the UIPA.
- A single error or act, without regard to the frequency of the error or act, can equate to an unfair business practice under the UIPA. Cal. Ins. Code § 790.03(h)(1-5).
- The term "knowingly" as used in Insurance Code § 790.03(h) does not require actual knowledge or any scienter whatsoever, but can be satisfied with merely constructive or implied knowledge.
- An act is "willful" as used in Insurance Code § 790.035, and subject to increased penalties, if the act is done with a mere willingness to commit the act.
- The phrase "misrepresent[ation of] pertinent facts" in Insurance Code §
 790.03(h)(1) includes the omission of a statutory notice in a form. Moreover, the
 Opinion also purports to make any incorrectly paid claim a misrepresentation of
 pertinent facts.
- The term "claimants" in section § 790.03(h)(1) includes providers.
- The Commissioner is entitled to impose thousands of dollars in penalties for each

Government Code § 11425.60 allows an agency to designate as a "precedent decision" "a decision or part of a decision that contains a significant legal or policy determination of general application that is likely to recur."

incorrectly paid claim without ever running afoul of the Constitution's prohibition against excessive fines.

 The Commissioner can designate an opinion as a "precedent decision" and set forth new acts that violate the UIPA without conducting a hearing pursuant to Insurance Code § 790.06.

Each of these novel interpretations disregards the express language of the UIPA, ignores existing case law interpreting the statute, or both. Based on these incorrect legal rulings, the Commissioner found PacifiCare liable for violating the UIPA – specifically California Insurance Code § 790.03(h) – and imposed an unprecedented penalty, more than ten times what the Administrative Law Judge handling the PacifiCare matter determined was appropriate.

But the Opinion reaches significantly beyond PacifiCare. Because the Opinion was designated a "precedent decision," and because of the UIPA's general applicability to all California insurance licensees, the Opinion purports to set forth a new interpretation of the UIPA that will be binding on and enforceable against every licensee – including insurers, agents, and brokers – subject to the CDI's jurisdiction. Indeed, the Commissioner considers that he has adopted a new regulation, in designating the opinion a "precedent."

Through this motion, Association of Life and Health Insurance Companies ("ACLHIC"), American Council of Life Insurers ("ACLI"), National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies ("NAMIC"), Pacific Association of Domestic Insurance Companies ("PADIC"), Personal Insurance Federation of California ("PIFC"), Property and Casualty Insurers Association of America ("PCIAA"), Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of California ("IIAB-Cal") and National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors – California ("NAIFA-CA") (collectively "Intervenors") request leave to intervene in this action pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 387. Intervenors seek to join with plaintiff and petitioner PacifiCare Life and Health Insurance Company ("PacifiCare") in challenging the Opinion.

The judgment in this case will have a binding effect on all CDI licensees, including

all of Intervenors' members. Intervenors therefore should be given the right to challenge the novel and purportedly precedential interpretations of the UIPA set forth in the Opinion. If intervention is not granted, Intervenors' members will be denied their due process rights to be heard and to provide input into the law and rules that will directly apply to their conduct. Intervenors' input is particularly important here, where the rulings announced in the Opinion will broadly affect the insurance industry in California and, ultimately, impact the costs and availability of insurance for California consumers.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Members of ACLHIC, PIFC, PCIAA, NAMIC, PADIC, ACLI, IIAB-CA, and NAIFA-CA.

Intervenors collectively represent the majority of CDI licensees. Their members write virtually every type of insurance sold in this state, including health, life, auto, homeowners, commercial general liability, commercial multi-peril, and other lines of insurance necessary to enable California's economy to function. Some members are among the largest insurance companies writing policies in California and the United States. Other members are relatively small and localized insurance companies. Still other members are life, health, and property/casualty agents and brokers. All of the Intervenors' members licensed by the CDI are subject to the UIPA and will be directly impacted by the Opinion's unprecedented interpretation of the UIPA.

B. The Insurance Commissioner's Decision In The PacifiCare Matter.

As described, the 220-page Opinion attempts to re-write the UIPA in a single stroke. The Opinion identifies legal "violations" that are not found in the UIPA itself. It claims for the Commissioner broad powers to impose enormous penalties that are not authorized by the statute. It asserts that the Commissioner has the authority to announce new legal rules and to make new regulations for an entire industry without having to follow legal, legislative, or regulatory processes. And it designates as a "precedent decision," binding on *every* CDI licensee, an Opinion that imposes novel and extreme

statutory interpretations, governing an extensive number of routine insurance transactions, without any input from the industry over either their legality or their practical impact on the cost of insurance. As a result, the new rules set forth in the Opinion will affect all of Intervenors' members, since every Administrative Law Judge and every CDI enforcement officer will be bound to apply the Opinion's rulings and interpretations.

I. INTERVENORS EASILY SATISFY THE STANDARDS FOR INTERVENTION.

Code of Civil Procedure section 387(a) provides that the Court may permit intervention where: (1) the non-party has a direct and immediate interest in the litigation; (2) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the case; and (3) the reasons for intervention outweigh any opposition by the existing parties. *Truck Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court*, 60 Cal. App. 4th 342, 346 (1997); *Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court*, 84 Cal. App. 4th 383, 386 (2000).

The purpose of permissive intervention is "to promote fairness by involving all parties potentially affected by a judgment." *Simpson Redwood Co. v. State of Calif.*, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1199 (1987). For that reason, section 387 should be liberally construed in favor of intervention. *Id.* at 1200.

A. Intervenors Have a Direct and Immediate Interest In This Litigation.

Intervenors have a direct interest in the outcome of this litigation. "The requirement of a 'direct' and 'immediate' interest means that the interest must be of such a direct and immediate nature that the moving party will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment." *Lindelli v. Town of San Anselmo*, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1499, 1505 (2006) (internal citations omitted). A direct interest sufficient to support intervention need not be a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the dispute, nor a specific interest in the property or transaction involved in the case (as is required for intervention as of right). *Simpson Redwood Co.*, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1200-01. Similarly, a party seeking to intervene does not need to show that its interest inevitably will be affected by the outcome of the litigation, but rather a substantial probability of such effect

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is sufficient. Id. Thus, "[a] person has a direct interest justifying intervention in litigation where the judgment of the action of itself adds to or detracts from his legal rights without reference to rights and duties not involved in the litigation." Continental Vinyl Products Corp. v. Mead Corp., 27 Cal. App. 3d 543, 549 (1972).

Intervenors and their members stand to gain or lose substantially by the operation of the judgment in this case, and the decision will have a profound effect on their legal rights and obligations. The decision in this case will impact the rules applicable to the claims handling and business practices of all of Intervenors' members. It will decide whether the Commissioner's unlawful interpretation of the UIPA will be overturned, or whether Intervenors' members instead effectively will be subject to new (and unlawful) rules and regulations. It will adjudicate whether the Commissioner can appropriate to himself the legislative power of declaring new violations of the UIPA and determining appropriate penalties for them. It will determine whether the Commissioner can use his authority to designate an opinion as precedential in order to effectively create new regulations, while simultaneously circumventing the regulatory process, denying Intervenors the opportunity to petition the government, and muting Intervenors' right to be heard.

Intervenors have a direct and powerful interest in this litigation because the Opinion does more than merely impose a penalty on PacifiCare for its alleged violations of the UIPA. Rather, the Opinion interprets regulatory and statutory laws relating to all California insurance licensees in an unprecedented manner. As a "precedent" decision, these interpretations will have a binding effect on all insurance licensees doing business in the state.

Summarizing the Opinion's central holdings makes manifest their manifold potential effects on Intervenors.

An alleged violation of a statute outside the UIPA may be treated as a violation of the UIPA. Contrary to the Opinion, the UIPA itself states that only certain acts expressly delineated in the UIPA itself constitute a violation of the

UIPA. If this new ruling stands, it will mean that Intervenors' members could be subject to fines for acts that are not unlawful under the UIPA, but which the Commissioner unilaterally and after-the-fact decides to treat as UIPA violations.

- A single act can violate Insurance Code § 790.03(h)(1-5). Unlike the Opinion, Insurance Code § 790.03(h)(1-5) requires proof of a *general business practice*, not a single act. If the Commissioner's improper interpretation stands, it could subject Intervenors' members to liability for acts that do not rise to business practices and also would transform a single, inadvertent error repeated multiple times through automation into a "business practice."
- A single error, without regard to the error's frequency, can also equate to an unfair "business practice." The UIPA requires that, to constitute a violation, an act must be performed with frequency. The Opinion ambiguously interprets this to mean "over and over again." Given the number of insurance claims that Intervenors' process, the Opinion's interpretation could result in very rare events errors that happen in a tiny percentage of claims being treated as business "practices," contrary to the UIPA itself.
- The term "knowing" as used in Insurance Code § 790.03(h) does not require actual knowledge and requires no level of scienter. This ruling is flatly contrary to settled California law, which requires some level of scienter for an act to be "knowing." In contrast, the Commissioner's interpretation amounts to holding that any conduct inconsistent with the law will be considered "knowing."
- An act is "willful" as used in Insurance Code § 790.035 if it is merely done with a willingness to commit the act. Again, this analysis is inconsistent with existing law. In the context of the two-tiered penalty system created by the UIPA, California law holds that conduct cannot be "willful" and therefore subject to more stringent penalties if the actor has a good faith belief that the conduct is lawful. The Commissioner's contrary interpretation is based on his incorrect reliance on the improper interpretation of a regulation that he himself propounded. The

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Commissioner lacks authority to rewrite settled California law simply because he would like to do so.

- The term "misrepresent[ation of] . . . pertinent facts" in Insurance Code § 790.03(h)(1) includes the omission of a notice of a statutory right in a form. The Commissioner's interpretation of "misrepresentation" would translate even an inadvertent omission of a statutory notice into a misrepresentation of fact.
- The term "claimants" in Insurance Code § 790.03(h)(1) includes medical providers. Under the UIPA's plain language, a "claimant" must be a "beneficiary under the terms of that policy." Medical providers may benefit from the existence of an insurance policy, but they are not the "beneficiaries" of a policy. Thus, providers cannot be considered "claimants" within the meaning of § 790.03(h)(1).
- The Commissioner can designate an opinion as a "precedent decision" and set forth new acts as violations of the UIPA without conducting a hearing pursuant to Insurance Code § 790.06. The Insurance Code provides a precise mechanism for adding to the list of methods, acts, and practices that can violate the UIPA – a hearing pursuant to § 790.06. The Commissioner cannot add to the list of acts that violate the UIPA merely by issuing a precedent decision that declares those acts to be violations, as he purports to do here.
- The Commissioner can pile up penalties purportedly imposed on a "per act" basis without ever violating the Constitution's prohibition on excessive fines. But the Commissioner has discretion in assessing penalties precisely so that excessive fines are not imposed. The Opinion purports to establish a schedule that creates "baseline" penalties for certain acts and permits the accumulation of penalties in a manner that is not authorized or envisioned by the statute.

Even this cursory cataloguing of the Opinion's key holdings demonstrates why Intervenors (on behalf of their members) have a direct interest in the outcome of this litigation. Intervenors have a strong interest in defending the appropriate and lawful

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interpretation of the statutory scheme applicable to their members. See Bustop v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. App. 3d 66, 71 (1977) (finding that a group of parents had a sufficient interest "in a sound educational system and in the operation of that system in accordance with the law" to permit intervention in an action involving a school district desegregation plan); see also People ex rel. Rominger v. County of Trinity, 147 Cal. App. 3d 655, 661-63 (1983) (the Sierra Club, on behalf of its members, had a strong interest in the enforcement of laws relating to the spraying of phenoxy herbicides when its members used the land that would be sprayed). Intervenors also have a strong interest in ensuring that they are not subject to liability or penalties for acts that were never intended to be within the realm of the UIPA.

As discussed in their Verified Complaint in Intervention, Intervenors could challenge the legal standards announced by the Commissioner in the Opinion through their own petition for mandamus and complaint for declaratory relief. *See Spanish Speaking Citizens Foundation v. Low*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1179, 1208 (2000) (describing challenges brought by consumer groups and cities to auto rating regulations as interpreted by the Commissioner in an administrative decision); *see also* 9 Witkin, Cal. Proc. 5th (2008) Admin. Proc. § 130, p. 1256-57 ("A person aggrieved by an agency determination has a right to independent judicial review of questions of law, such as those dealing with the interpretation and application of statutes or judicial precedents.") (*citing*, *inter alia*, *Spanish Speaking Citizens*, 85 Cal. App. 4th at 1216).

B. Intervention Will Not Enlarge The Issues In This Litigation.

Intervenors will not enlarge the issues being litigated if they are permitted to intervene. Where an intervenor attempts only to claim an interest in the action and to participate in the litigation, courts have found that there is no enlargement of the issues.

² Intervenors could bring their own action for declaratory relief to specifically test the validity of the regulations that support the Commissioner's decision. See Environmental Protection Information Center v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection, 43 Cal. App. 4th 1011, 1017-18 (1996) (organization has standing to challenge regulations under Government Code § 11350 "if either it or its members is or may well be impacted by a challenged regulation.").

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Rominger, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 664-65 (intervention proper when intervenors raised no new legal or factual issues and the only issue before the court was the validity of County ordinances).

The central issue in this action is whether the rules set forth by the Commissioner in the Opinion are consistent with California law and within the scope of the Commissioner's authority. That issue will remain the same if Intervenors are allowed to participate. Intervenors' challenges to the legal rules announced in the Commissioner's Opinion are similar to PacifiCare's challenges, although Intervenors' objections are rooted in concerns about the effect the Opinion's legal rulings will have on their members and on the broader insurance industry. And, as representatives of the majority of California insurers, Intervenors are specially situated to ensure that the entire industry, not just PacifiCare, is represented in this "precedential" action.

Similarly, the causes of action in Intervenors' Complaint also overlap with those in PacifiCare's Complaint. Indeed, intervention would be proper even where an intervenor seeks to allege wholly new causes of action, if the new matter would "not delay the litigation, change the position of the parties, or even require introduction of additional evidence" and would not "prolong, confuse or disrupt" the lawsuit. *Simpson Redwood Co.*, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1202-03.

In short, permitting Intervenors to participate in this action would enlarge the Court's perspective on the key issues in this matter without enlarging the issues to be litigated. Permitting intervention also would afford Intervenors' members the opportunity to be heard on issues of critical importance to each of them, and to the entire insurance industry.

C. The Reasons Supporting Intervention Outweigh Any Basis for Opposition By The Existing Parties.

Intervention is appropriate where the reasons for intervention outweigh any interest on the part of the existing parties in conducting the lawsuit "unburdened by others." See City & County of San Francisco v. State of California, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1030, 1036

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(2005). As discussed above, Intervenors have a direct and immediate interest in intervening to protect their members from being subjected to new rules and regulations without due process.

In contrast, the existing parties – both of which have been informed of Intervenors' motion – have no substantial interest to oppose intervention. Indeed, PacifiCare has indicated that it does not intend to oppose the motion. The Commissioner has indicated that it will not stipulate to the intervention or file a statement of non-opposition. To the extent the Commissioner actually plans to oppose the motion, he lacks any sound basis to do so. The Commissioner has put the interests of Intervenors' members directly at issue by designating the Opinion as a "precedent opinion" and by his stated intention to use the rules set forth in the Opinion in further rulings. Through the Opinion, the Commissioner single-handedly has attempted to change the rules and regulations that impact all CDI licenses. It would be unfair and inappropriate to prevent those licensees from protecting their own interests through participation in these proceedings.

INTERVENORS HAVE MOVED PROMPTLY TO INTERVENE.

Intervenors' motion to intervene is timely. "[I]t is the general rule that a right to intervene should be asserted within a reasonable time and that the intervener must not be guilty of an unreasonable delay after knowledge of the suit." Allen v. Calif. Water & Tel. Co., 31 Cal. 2d 104, 108 (1947). Indeed, a party may be allowed to intervene at any time, even after entry of judgment, as long as it is reasonable under the circumstances. Mallick v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 434, 437 (1979).

Intervenors have acted promptly here. PacifiCare filed its petition for writ of administrative mandamus on July 10, 2014. On September 26, 2014, the Commissioner filed an answer to the petition. After discussing the desire to intervene amongst themselves and after hiring counsel, Intervenors (through their counsel) contacted Adam Cole. Deputy Commissioner and General Counsel for the California Department of Insurance, and Steve Velkei, counsel for PacifiCare, to inform Mr. Cole and Mr. Velkei

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that Intervenors intended to intervene in this action. See accompanying Declaration of Vanessa Wells. Prior to this conversation, Intervenors' counsel was informed that the parties intended to meet and confer on October 16, 2014 regarding case management issues. Id. Intervenors therefore ensured that they informed Commissioner's counsel of their intent to intervene on October 15, prior to this meeting. During the October 15 discussion, Mr. Cole did not indicate whether the Commissioner would oppose Intervenors' motion. Id. Mr. Velkei indicated that he did not anticipate that PacifiCare would oppose Intervenors' motion.

On October 30, 2014, Intervenors' counsel met in person with Mr. Cole and other representatives of the Commissioner. Intervenors' counsel subsequently provided Mr. Cole with a draft copy of Intervenors' Complaint. On November 18, 2014, Mr. Cole informed Intervenors' counsel that the Department would not stipulate or file a statement of non-opposition to the intervention. Intervenors are filing this motion promptly, within a few days of learning of the Commissioner's position.

Other than PacifiCare's Petition and the Commissioner's Answer, no other substantive documents have been filed. This matter is in the very early stages. The administrative record has not yet been prepared and lodged with the Court, and the schedule for briefing and hearing of the merits of the petition has not been set. There will thus be no disruption in the case if Intervenors are permitted to intervene at this stage.

III. CONCLUSION.

This case presents significant issues regarding interpretations of laws that are binding on all insurers licensed by the CDI. Intervenors' represent the majority of California insurers subject to those laws and they thus have an immense interest in the outcome of this litigation. Intervenors respectfully request that this Court grant their

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1	motion for leave to intervene and permit the filing of their Proposed Complaint in	
2	Intervention.	
3	HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP Dated: November 21, 2014	
4	By: Nulum Chalely	
5	Michael Maddigan Attorneys for Intervenors	
6	Association of California Life and Health	
7	Insurance Companies, Personal Insurance Federation of California, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, National	
8	Insurers Association of America, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, Pacific Association of Domestic Insurance	
9	Companies, American Council of Life	
10	Insurers, Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of California, and National Association of Insurance and Financial	
11	Advisors – California	
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PROOF OF SERVICE 1 2 I, Carmela Barrera, declare: 3 I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Los Angeles County, California. I am 4 over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400, Los Angeles, California 90067. On November 21, 5 6 2014, I served a copy of the within document(s): MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 7 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE 8 by transmitting via facsimile the document(s) listed above to the fax number(s) set 9 forth below on this date before 5:00 p.m. 10 by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, the United States mail at Los Angeles, California addressed as set 11 forth below. 12 by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed Federal Express envelope and X affixing a pre-paid air bill, and causing the envelope to be delivered to a Federal 13 Express agent for delivery. by personally delivering the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the 14 address(es) set forth below. 15 by transmitting via e-mail or electronic transmission the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the e-mail address(es) set forth below. 16 Attorneys for Petitioner and Plaintiff Daniel M. Kolkey 17 Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP PacifiCare Life And Health Insurance 555 Mission Street, Suite 3000 18 Company San Francisco, CA 94105-0921 19 Steven A. Velkei Attorneys for Petitioner and Plaintiff Dentons US LLP 20 PacifiCare Life And Health Insurance 601 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2500 Company Los Angeles, CA 90017 21 Lisa W. Chao Attorneys for Respondent and Defendant 22 Attorney General's Office Dave Jones, in his Capacity as Insurance 300 S Spring St Commissioner of the State of California 23 Los Angeles, CA 90013-1230 Adam M. Cole 24 Respondent and Defendant Teresa Campbell Dave Jones, in his Capacity as Insurance 25 California Department of Insurance Commissioner of the State of California 45 Fremont Street, Suite 2300 26 San Francisco, CA 94105 27 I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence

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for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same

day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on November 21, 2014, at Los Angeles, California. HOGAN LOVELLS US

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE

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LOS ANGELES